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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs 
may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate 
the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian 
negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We 
then show that a ‘Coasian solution’ to this hold-up problem is not available. This is 
because a Coasian solution to the hold-up problem typically entails a negotation 
about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation which in turn is 
associated with a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence with a new hold-up problem. 
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Transaction Costs and the Coase Theorem
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The Coase theorem (Coase 1960) has had a pervasive influence on the way economists
and legal scholars think about inefficiencies. It guarantees that provided that property
rights are allocated, fully informed rational agent involved in an inefficient situation
will ensure through negotiation that there are no unexploited gains from trade and
hence an efficient outcome obtains.
In its strongest formulation, the Coase theorem is interpreted as guaranteeing
an efficient outcome regardless of the “way in which property rights are assigned”
(Nicholson (1989, p.725)) and whenever the potential mutual gains “exceed [the]
necessary bargaining costs” (Nicholson (1989, p.726)).1
The predictions entailed by the stronger version of the Coase theorem are startling.
Whenever property rights are allocated, we should observe only outcomes which are
constrained efficient in the sense that all potential gains from trade (net of transaction
costs) are exploited. This clearly contradicts even the most casual observation of
empirical facts. The economic world is full of inefficient situations in which obvious
Pareto improving negotiation opportunities are available but they are left unexploited
by the parties involved.
If we were to believe the predictions of the ‘strong’ Coase theorem, all these
apparent inefficiencies would not be real inefficiencies at all. They should simply be
viewed as the result of transaction costs which are ‘high’ relative to the potential
gains from trade. We take the view that this is not a satisfactory explanation of these
observed facts.
Our aim in this paper is to take issue with this strong version of the Coase Theorem
and show that the impact of transaction costs can extend over and above their size
relative to the potential gains form trade. This stems from the strategic role which
transaction costs may play in a Coasian negotiation. It turns out that a key factor in
determining the strategic role of transaction costs is whether they are payable before
1This stronger version of the Coase theorem does not correspond to what is claimed in Coase
(1960), but it is an interpretation of it which is sufficiently common to have found its way into basic
microeconomic text-books such as the one quoted above.
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or after the negotiation on the distribution of the unexploited gains from trade takes
place. Our analysis below highlights the impact of ex-ante transaction costs.
The primary effect of ex-ante transaction costs is that they may generate a con-
strained inefficient outcome. In the most basic version of our model the agents may
end up not exploiting any of the potential gains from trade, and hence the poten-
tially beneficial negotiation may not even occur. When the choice of ex-ante costs is
‘gradual’, higher costs paid correspond to a more ‘detailed’ negotiation that allows
the parties to exploit better the potential gains from trade and hence to achieve a
higher surplus from the negotiation. In this case the agents will, in general, end up
leaving part of the potential gains from trade unexploited. In other words, they will
choose to negotiate an agreement which is less detailed than would be optimal, after
the ex-ante costs are taken into account. In its simplest form, the strategic effect
which drives our results below is not hard to outline.
Consider any ‘Coasian negotiation’ with the following features.2 Two agents con-
template entering a negotiation which might yields a surplus of an arbitrary given
size. Moreover, the two agents’ shares of the surplus generated by the negotiation
are exogenously given, say because the extensive form which they must use in the
negotiation is itself exogenously given.
Suppose now that there are ex-ante transaction costs associated with this negoti-
ation. In particular, suppose that the agents must each pay a given cost before the
negotiating phase begins. Then, if the distribution of ex-ante costs is such that one
(or both) agents will not be able to recoup the ex-ante cost given the distribution of
surplus, the negotiation will not take place. This is possible even when the total of
ex-ante costs across the two agents is less than the surplus which the negotiation may
generate so that it would be socially efficient for the agents to pay the ex-ante costs
and negotiate the division of the surplus.
In this paper we model this situation taking the distribution of surplus as ex-
ogenously given, in Anderlini and Felli (1998) and Anderlini and Felli (2001a) we
explore a variety of extensive forms in which the agents are allowed to bargain over
2By this we mean a situation in which the property rights of the agents are sufficiently well
defined to allow them to enter into a negotiating phase, and that there are some un-exploited gains
from trade. This obviously covers an extremely wide variety of possible situations, ranging from
text-book like externalities to complex contingent contracts.
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the distribution of surplus, provided of course that the ex-ante costs have been paid.
We find that the problem we have described is ‘highly pervasive’ in the sense that in
a whole variety of extensive forms, the agents will not negotiate an agreement even
though it would be socially efficient to do so.
What we have just described is a version of a source of inefficiencies well known
in contract theory as the ‘hold-up problem’ (Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986,
Hart and Moore 1988, among many others). The problem is particularly acute in
our setting since it may be impossible for the negotiating parties to find a ‘Coasian
solution’ to this hold-up problem for the following reasons.
Imagine that the two agents in the negotiation we have described attempt to
resolve the inefficiency in the following (Coasian) way. Before the ex-ante costs are
paid, they negotiate a transfer of money which will compensate the agent who is
unable to recoup the ex-ante cost for his loss, of course contingent on his paying the
ex-ante cost. Provided the sum of ex-ante costs does not exceed the surplus generated
by the negotiation, such transfer can always be arranged so that both agents now
benefit from paying the ex-ante costs and entering the negotiation. However, the
problem which arises now is that the contingent compensating transfer can itself be
viewed as a Coasian negotiation, which may involve a new set of ex-ante costs.
Suppose that the ‘second tier’ negotiation we have described does indeed involve
a new set of strictly positive ex-ante costs. Suppose moreover that the second tier
ex-ante costs must be paid for, and the second tier negotiation must occur, before the
first order costs are paid for and the first order negotiation occurs.3
Then it is possible to show that the ex-ante costs associated with the second tier
negotiation may not be paid. In particular there always exists an equilibrium such
that the contingent compensating transfer is not negotiated and therefore does not
take place. Hence, the ex-ante costs associated with the first tier negotiation will,
in turn, not be paid, and the actual surplus will not materialize. This outcome is of
particular interest since it is the only one which survives when we restrict attention
to ‘renegotiation-proof’ equilibria. In other words if, in a Coasian spirit, we insist
3This is obviously an assumption as such. However, we believe it to be plausible in a wide variety
of cases.
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that the outcome of negotiation at every stage must yield a (constrained) efficient
outcome, the overall outcome is not efficient and therefore not Coasian at all.
The hold-up problem described above is less pervasive in an environment in which
each party to the negotiation has an incentive to bestow a higher share of the surplus
to his partner for reasons that may have nothing to do with the partner’s payment of
the ex-ante transaction costs. In Section 6 below we consider one of these reasons. If
the size of the surplus shared by the two parties depends on the distribution dictated
by the negotiation, then each party may be willing to leave his counterpart more than
his outside option in the attempt to increase the overall size of the surplus. This may
result in a smaller range of parameter values for which the hold-up problem described
above occurs.
1.2. Related Literature
It is clear that the original version of the Coase theorem (Coase 1960) explicitly
assumes the absence of any transaction costs or other frictions in the bargaining
process. Indeed, Coase (1992) describes the theorem as a provocative result that was
meant to show how unrealistic is the world without transaction costs.4
Here, we go further by identifying the crucial strategic role played by ex-ante trans-
action costs (as opposed, for instance, to those transaction costs which are payable
ex-post) which may lead to an outcome that is constrained inefficient.
We are certainly not the first to point out that the Coase theorem no longer
holds when there are frictions in the negotiation process. There is a vast literature on
bargaining models where the frictions take the form of incomplete and asymmetric in-
formation. With incomplete information, efficient agreements often cannot be reached
and delays in bargaining may obtain.5 By contrast, the reduced form negotiation that
we consider in our analysis is one of complete information. The source of inefficiencies
in this paper can therefore be traced directly to the presence of transaction costs.
As in our analysis, Dixit and Olson (2000) are concerned with a classical Coasian
public good problem in which they explicitly model the agents’ ex-ante (possibly
4de Meza (1988) provides an extensive survey of the literature on the Coase theorem, including
an outline of its history and possible interpretations.
5See Muthoo (1999) for an up-to-date coverage as well as extensive references on this strand of
literature and other issues in bargaining theory.
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costly) decisions of whether to participate or not in the bargaining process. In their
setting they find both efficient and inefficient equilibria as opposed to the unique
constrained inefficient equilibrium we derive in our setting. They also highlight the
inefficiency of the symmetric (mixed-strategy) equilibria of their model.
The papers that are closest to the present one are Anderlini and Felli (2001a)
and Anderlini and Felli (2001b). In particular, Anderlini and Felli (2001b) is also
concerned with the hold-up problem generated by ex-ante contractual costs in a model
of a Coasian negotiation and with the inefficiencies it generates. However, while the
parties’ bargaining power is taken as a primitive in the present analysis, in Anderlini
and Felli (2001b) we take as primitive a general formulation of the ‘game forms’ that
define the actual negotiation game played by the parties. We then show that the
inefficiencies generated by the presence of ex-ante transaction costs are robust to this
general formulation of the the protocol followed by the actual negotiation and any
possible associated compensating transfers. In Anderlini and Felli (2001b) we also
interpret our results in a different vein as the ones presented here. In particular, there
we argue that the hold-up problem created by ex-ante transaction costs should be
considered a major source of contractual incompleteness.
Anderlini and Felli (2001a) instead focuses on a specific extensive form of the par-
ties’ negotiation in the presence of ex-ante transaction costs: the alternating offers
bargaining game with complete information with potentially infinite rounds of nego-
tiation in which the players discount the future at a strictly positive rate (Rubinstein
1982). Ex-ante transaction costs are modeled as positive costs that both parties, at
each round of negotiation, must pay to participate to that round of the bargaining
game. In this environment, in Anderlini and Felli (2001a) we show that a whole
plethora of inefficiencies may arise. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient
to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement
is never reached. Secondly, even when there are equilibria in which an agreement
is reached, we find that the model always has an equilibrium in which agreement is
never reached, as well as equilibria in which agreement is delayed for an arbitrary
length of time. Finally, the equilibrium in which agreement is never reached is per-
vasive in the sense that if the parties are given the opportunity to renegotiate out of
these inefficient outcomes, the only equilibrium outcome that survives is the one in
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which agreement is never reached, regardless of the value of the transaction costs.
1.3. Overview
We begin with a discussion of the possible interpretations of the ex-ante transaction
costs in Section 2. In Section 3 we present the simplest possible model of the basic
hold-up problem associated with a surplus-enhancing negotiation. This problem is
analyzed in the case in which the ex-ante costs associated with the Coasian negotiation
are discrete and are either complements or substitutes. In Section 4 we address the
question of whether a Coasian solution to our basic hold-up problem is plausible.
We do this by analyzing the possibility of a negotiated transfer from one party to the
other before the payment of the transaction costs that are at the origin of the hold-up
problem. We then turn (Section 5) to the analysis of a simple model in which the
agents’ choice of ex-ante costs is continuous. In Section 6 we present a model in which
the size of the surplus available to the parties depends on its distribution. Section 7
offers some concluding remarks. To ease the exposition, we have relegated all proofs
to the Appendix.
2. Ex-Ante Transaction Costs
We are concerned with Coasian negotiations in which the parties have to incur some
ex-ante transaction costs, before they reach the stage in which the actual negotiation
occurs.
The interpretation of these ex-ante transaction costs which we favor is that of
time spent ‘preparing’ for the Coasian negotiation. Typically, a variety of tasks need
to be carried out by the parties involved before the actual negotiation begins.
In those cases in which the negotiation of an agreement contingent on a state
of nature is concerned, both parties need to conceive of, and agree upon, a suitable
language to describe precisely the possible realizations of the state of nature. The
parties also need to collect and analyze information about the ‘legal environment’ in
which the agreement will be embedded. For instance, in different countries the same
agreement will need to be drawn-up differently to make it legally binding and hence
enforceable.
6
Transaction Costs and the Coase Theorem
In virtually all settings in which a negotiation is required the parties need to
spend time arranging a way to ‘meet’, and they need to ‘earmark’ some of their time
schedules for the actual meeting.
In many cases, before a meaningful negotiation can start, the parties will need
to collect and analyze background information which may be relevant to their un-
derstanding of the actual trading opportunities. These activities may range from
collecting information about (for instance the credit-worthiness of) the other party,
to actual ‘thinking’ or ‘complexity’ costs incurred to understand the negotiation prob-
lem. We view this type of ex-ante transaction costs as both relevant and important
for the type of effects which we identify in our analysis below. However, it should
be emphasized that our model does not directly apply to this type of costs. This
is because in our model the size of the gains from trade is fixed and known to the
parties. On the other hand, the lack of information and/or understanding of the
negotiation setting which we have just described, would clearly make the size of the
surplus uncertain for the parties involved. We have not considered the case of uncer-
tain surplus for reasons of space and analytical convenience. However, we conjecture
that the general ‘flavor’ of our results generalizes to this case.
We conclude this section with an observation. In many cases the parties to a
negotiation will have the opportunity to delegate to outsiders many of the tasks
which we have mentioned as sources of ex-ante transaction costs. The most common
example of this is the hiring of lawyers. In these cases, the time costs which we have
just discussed will be monetized at an appropriate rate. Abstracting from agency
problems (between the negotiating party/principal and the lawyer/agent), which are
likely to increase the ex-ante costs anyway, our analysis applies, unchanged, to the
case in which the ex-ante transaction costs are payable in money.
3. Discrete Transaction Costs
3.1. Perfect Complements
Our model consists of two agents, called A and B, who face a ‘Coasian’ opportunity
to realize some gains from trade. Without loss of generality we normalize the size of
the surplus, which is realized if an agreement is reached, to be one, and we set the
parties’ payoffs in the case disagreement to be equal to zero.
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In the simple model we analyze in this section, once the negotiating phase is
reached the division of surplus between the two agents is exogenously given and cannot
be changed by the agents. This should be thought of as the result of the agents having
exogenously given bargaining power in the negotiating phase (the extensive form of
the bargaining game they play to divide the surplus is exogenously given).6
Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be the share of the surplus which accrues to agent A if the parties
engage in the negotiation and 1− λ the share of the surplus which accrues to B.
For the negotiation to start, each agent has to pay a given ex-ante transaction
cost. In other words, the agents reach the negotiating phase only if they both pay
a certain amount before the negotiation begins.7 These costs should be thought of
as representing a combination of the activities necessary for the gains from trade to
materialize which we discussed in some detail in Section 2 above.
Let cA > 0 and cB > 0 be the two agents’ ex-ante costs. Clearly, if cA + cB > 1
then the two agents will never reach the negotiation that yields the unit surplus, but
then neither would a social planner since the total cost of the negotiation exceeds the
surplus which it yields. We are interested in the case in which it would be socially
efficient for the two agents to negotiate an agreement. Our first assumption guarantees
that this is the case.
Assumption 1: The surplus which the negotiation yields exceeds the total ex-ante
costs which are payable for the negotiation to occur. In other words cA + cB < 1.
Our two agents play a two-stage game. In period t = 0 they both simultaneously
and independently decide whether to pay their ex-ante cost. Only if both agents pay
their ex-ante cost at t = 0, do they have the possibility of negotiating an agreement
yielding a surplus of size one at t = 1.8 We simplify the analysis of the game at t = 1
by taking it as a ‘black box’ yielding payoffs of λ to A and 1 − λ to B. If one or
6In Section 6 below, we consider the possibility that the size of the surplus may depend on its
distribution across the agents.
7Notice therefore that we are implicitly assuming that the agents have some endowments of
resources out of which the ex-ante costs can be paid.
8Notice that we are therefore assuming that the two agents’ ex-ante costs are perfect complements
in the ‘technology’ which determines whether the surplus-generating negotiation is feasible or not.
We examine the cases of perfect substitutes, and of strategic complements in Subsections 3.2 and
3.3 below respectively.
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pay cB not pay cB
pay cA λ− cA, 1− λ− cB −cA, 0
not pay cA 0, −cB 0, 0
Figure 1: Normal form of the two-stage game with ex-ante costs.
both agents do not pay their ex-ante costs at t = 0, the game at t = 1 is trivial: the
negotiation which yields the unit surplus is not feasible; the agents have no actions
to take and they both receive a payoff of zero.
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise stated, by equilibrium we mean a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game at hand.
The normal form which corresponds to the two-stage game we have just described
is depicted in Figure 1. From this it is immediate to derive our first two propositions,
which therefore are stated without proof.
Proposition 1: Let a pair of ex-ante costs cA > 0 and cB > 0 satisfying Assumption
1 be given. Then there exists a range of values — namely Λ = [0, cA) ∪ (1 − cB, 1]
— for the distribution parameter λ such that the only equilibrium of the two-stage
game represented in Figure 1 has neither agent paying the ex-ante cost, and therefore
yields the no-agreement outcome.
Proposition 2: Let any value of the distribution parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] be given. Then
there exists a set C = {cA, cB | either cA > λ or cB > 1 − λ and cA + cB < 1} of
pairs of ex-ante costs which satisfy Assumption 1, and such that the only equilibrium
of the two-stage game represented in Figure 1 has neither agent paying the ex-ante
cost, and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.
We view Propositions 1 and 2 together as implying that in the presence of ex-ante
transaction costs, if the distribution of ex-ante costs across the parties is sufficiently
‘mis-matched’ with the given distribution of surplus, then the ex-ante costs will gen-
erate a version of the hold-up problem which will induce the agents not to negotiate
an agreement even though it would be socially efficient to do so.
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The intuition behind our results above is simple enough. If negotiating an agree-
ment involves some costs which are payable ex-ante, the share of the surplus accruing
to each party will not depend, in equilibrium, on whether the ex-ante costs are paid.
Therefore, the parties will pay the costs only if the distribution of the surplus gener-
ated by the negotiation will allow them to recoup the cost ex-post. If the distribution
of surplus and that of ex-ante costs are sufficiently ‘mis-matched’, then one of the
agents will not be able to recoup the ex-ante cost. In this case, an agreement will not
be reached, even though it would generate a total surplus large enough to cover the
ex-ante costs of both agents.
Consider now, as a benchmark, the alternative setup in which both parties can pay
the costs cA and cB after the negotiation has occurred and an agreement is reached.
In other words the transaction costs can be paid ex-post rather than ex-ante.9 In this
case the extensive form of the game is equivalent to a simple negotiation in which the
size of the gains from trade is 1− cA− cB. The assumption we made on the black-box
negotiation implies that in this case the two parties do indeed reach an agreement.
Party A receives the share of surplus λ (1− cA− cB) while party B receives the share
(1 − λ) (1 − cA − cB). In other words when transaction costs can be paid ex-post
the strong version of the Coase Theorem holds and a constrained efficient outcome is
achieved.
We conclude this subsection with two observations. First of all, the simultaneity
in the payment of the ex-ante costs is not essential to Propositions 1 and 2. Both
results apply to the case in which the ex-ante costs are payable sequentially by the
two agents before the actual negotiation begins.
Secondly, while the model has a unique equilibrium for the parameter configura-
tions identified in Propositions 1 and 2, it has multiple equilibria whenever these two
propositions do not apply. It is clear that, whenever both λ > cA and (1−λ) > cB, the
model has two equilibria. One in which the ex-ante costs are paid and an agreement is
reached, and another in which neither agent pays the ex-ante costs simply because he
expects the other agent not to pay his cost either. The equilibrium in which the agree-
ment is reached strictly Pareto-dominates the no-agreement equilibrium. Clearly, the
9These ex-post costs could, for example, be associated with registering the agreement with the
relevant authorities.
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multiplicity of equilibria disappears if the costs are payable sequentially. The latter
observation will become relevant again in Section 4 below.
3.2. Perfect Substitutes
So far, we have assumed that the agents’ ex-ante costs are ‘perfect complements’ in
determining whether the negotiation of an agreement is feasible or not. The next
proposition tells us that when the agents’ ex-ante costs are perfect substitutes our
constrained inefficiency results of Subsection 3.1 still hold, although the inefficiency
may take a different form.
The intuition behind the next results is straightforward. In an environment in
which the ex-ante costs may be paid by either agent the negotiation leads to a con-
strained efficient outcome if at least one of the two ex-ante costs is smaller than the
size of the surplus. It is then easy to envisage a situation in which the share of the
surplus accruing to each agent is strictly smaller than his ex-ante costs although there
is enough surplus to cover the smallest of these costs. In this case, in equilibrium, the
parties will not reach an agreement although it would be socially efficient to do so.
When the ex-ante costs are perfect substitutes, a new type of inefficiency can also
arise in equilibrium. In particular, it is possible that the agents reach an agreement,
but the equilibrium involves the highest of the two ex-ante costs being paid.
Formally, when the ex-ante costs are perfect substitutes Assumption 1 needs to be
modified. Assumption 2 below identifies the range of ex-ante costs which guarantees
that negotiating an agreement is socially efficient in this case.
Assumption 2: The surplus which the agreement yields exceeds the minimum ex-
ante cost payable for the negotiation to become feasible. In other wordsmin{cA, cB} <
1. Without loss of generality (up to a re-labeling of agents) let cA ≤ cB. Hence cA < 1.
Consider now the model with ex-ante transaction costs that are perfect substitutes
and let Assumption 2 above hold. The normal form of our new two-stage game is
depicted in Figure 2.
We start with the case in which the value of the distribution parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]
is given. In such a case by varying the values of the transaction costs (cA, cB) it is
always possible to generate two different types of inefficiencies.
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pay cB not pay cB
pay cA λ− cA, 1− λ− cB λ− cA, 1− λ
not pay cA λ, 1− λ− cB 0, 0
Figure 2: Normal form when the ex-ante costs are perfect substitutes.
First of all, it is always possible that the ex-ante costs be such that the no-
agreement outcome obtains. This is immediate from the payoffs in Figure 2 and it is
stated without proof in our next proposition.
Proposition 3: For any given λ ∈ [0, 1] there exists a set Cˆ1 = {cA, cB | 1 > cA > λ
and cB > (1−λ)} of pairs of ex-ante costs satisfying Assumption 2 such that the only
equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2 has neither agent paying
the ex-ante cost, and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.
Secondly, given any λ ∈ [0, 1], it is possible that the ex-ante costs are such that
the second type of inefficiency we have mentioned above obtains in equilibrium. An
agreement is negotiated, but it is the agent with the highest ex-ante cost who pays
in equilibrium. Once again our claim follows immediately from the payoff matrix in
Figure 2 and it is stated without proof in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: For any given λ ∈ [0, 1/2) there exists a set Cˆ2 = {cA, cB | 1 > cA > λ
and cB < (1−λ)} of pairs of ex-ante costs satisfying Assumption 2 such that the only
equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2 has agent A not paying
the ex-ante cost cA, and B paying the ex-ante cost cB > cA.
10
Next, we consider the case in which we take as given the ex-ante costs (cA, cB).
In this case it is always possible that the value of the distribution parameter λ be
such that one of the two types of inefficiencies we have identified obtains in equilib-
rium. Again, we state our next proposition without proof since it is an immediate
consequence of the payoff matrix in Figure 2.
10Recall that we are assuming that cA ≤ cB . To deal with the range λ ∈ (1/2, 1] it is sufficient to
modify Assumption 2 to read cB ≤ cA and cB < 1. Proposition 4 does not hold when λ = 1/2.
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Proposition 5: Let a pair of ex-ante costs cA > 0 and cB > 0 satisfying Assumption
2 be given. Assume that cA 6= cB.
If it is the case that cA + cB ≤ 1, then for any λ in [0, cA) the unique equilibrium
of the model is constrained inefficient in the sense that an agreement is negotiated,
but it is B who pays the ex-ante cost cB > cA.
If it is the case that cA + cB > 1, then for any λ ∈ [0,min{0, 1− cB}] the (unique
if λ 6= 1 − cB) equilibrium of the model is, again, that an agreement is negotiated,
but it is B who pays the ex-ante cost. Moreover, for any λ ∈ (1− cB, cA) the unique
equilibrium of the model involves neither agent paying his ex-ante cost, and hence
yields the no-agreement outcome.
3.3. Strategic Complements
Our goal in this subsection is to show that the analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 hold
when the ex-ante costs are technologically perfect substitutes, but are ‘strategic com-
plements’ in the game-theoretic sense.11 We conjecture that this is true ‘in general’,
but we limit our formal analysis to an example which is a modification of the model
of the previous subsection.
The description of our next model is as follows. At t = 0 both agents decide
simultaneously and independently whether to pay their ex-ante costs. If both agents
decide not to pay the ex-ante costs, then negotiation is not feasible and both receive
a payoff of zero. If either agent i ∈ {A,B} pays the ex-ante cost ci at t = 0 the
negotiation of an agreement yielding one unit of surplus becomes feasible. If both
pay their ex-ante costs at t = 0 the distribution parameter λ determines the agreement
which is negotiated and the A’s and B’s payoffs are λ−cA and 1−λ−cB respectively.
However, if only one agent, say A, pays the ex-ante cost at t = 0, he is allowed
to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer ` to B at t = 1. The value of ` is interpreted as
an offer to make A’s and B’s payoffs equal ` and 1− ` respectively, minus any costs
paid. This can be thought of as a crude way to say that if only one agent pays the
ex-ante cost then the bargaining power shifts dramatically in his favor.
11Intuitively, two decision variables are strategic complements if an increase in one induces an
increase in the optimal choice (the ‘best response’ of the opposing player) of the other. See Fudenberg
and Tirole (1996, Ch. 12).
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Moreover, we assume that A, if he alone has paid the ex-ante cost, can, in prin-
ciple, make some offers which would push agent B below his individual rationality
constraint. In other words we assume that the take-it-or-leave-it offer ` must be in
the interval [−, 1 + ξ] with  and ξ some (possibly small) positive numbers.
At t = 2, B has two choices. He can either pay an ex-ante cost c′B > 0 or pay
nothing.12 If he does not pay he does not observe A’s offer, but is still allowed to
accept or reject it blind. If B decides to pay his ex-ante cost, he can then observe A’s
offer and subsequently decide to accept or reject it.
The description of the extensive form which is played if it is B alone who pays
the ex-ante cost at t = 0 is exactly symmetric to the case we have just described.
Notice that the strategic complementarity of the two agents’ ex-ante costs is built
into the extensive form game we have described precisely via the shift in bargaining
power which obtains when one agent alone pays the ex-ante costs at t = 0.
Suppose now that the parameters λ, cA and cB are such that the agents would
not negotiate an agreement in the model described in Subsection 3.1. Our next
proposition then tells us that, in the model with strategic complementarities we have
just described, they will not negotiate an agreement either.
Proposition 6: Consider the model with ex-ante costs which are strategic comple-
ments described above in this subsection. Assume that either λ < cA or 1− λ < cB.
Then the unique equilibrium outcome of the model has neither agent paying the
ex-ante cost at t = 0, and hence the no-agreement outcome obtains.
4. The Impossibility of a Coasian Solution
In Section 3 we have argued that ex-ante transaction costs may give rise to a version of
the hold-up problem which in turn generates an inefficient (no-agreement) outcome.
The next natural question to ask is then whether a Coasian solution to the hold-up
problem is generally available in the present set up. In other words: is it possible
to add another stage of negotiation to our model (say t = −1), prior to the stage
12Notice that while Proposition 6 below restricts the values of cA and cB to be in an appropriate
range, c′B can take any positive (small) value.
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in which the ex-ante costs are incurred, in which the agents can negotiate a ‘grand
agreement’, which will resolve the hold-up problem and hence restore efficiency?
The answer to the above question is trivially ‘yes’, if at t = −1 a truly grand agree-
ment can be negotiated costlessly, which specifies everything, including the payment
of the ex-ante costs, and the division of the actual surplus at time t = 1. The answer,
however, changes dramatically if the ‘grand agreement’ is itself costly.
We specify two crucial details of the grand agreement negotiation stage. First
of all we assume, as seems plausible in the present context, that in order to be able
to negotiate an agreement at t = −1 a fresh set of ex-ante costs must be incurred
by the parties before t = −1, say at t = −2. Secondly, we restrict the agents to
negotiate a compensating transfer at t = −1. In other words, we take a specific view
on the agreements which the agents can enter at t = −1. Indeed, we restrict them to
be transfers contingent on the payment of ex-ante costs at t = 0. This seems to be
in the spirit of our model of Section 3, in that, in principle, it allows the agents to
effectively transfer surplus between them, but it keeps the distribution of surplus in
the last stage of the negotiating process, t = 1, exogenously fixed, as before.13
It is worth emphasizing at this point that we find that the presence of any strictly
positive ‘second tier’ ex-ante costs might be sufficient to keep the addition of a grand
agreement negotiation stage from resolving the hold-up problem of Section 3. We view
this as a strength of the results we present in this section. Indeed, in many situations
it would be sensible to assume that the second tier ex-ante costs are in fact at least as
large as the ‘first tier’ ex-ante costs, on the grounds that the negotiation of a grand
agreement, in an intuitive sense, is a more complex object than the negotiation of the
agreement itself.
Formally, we modify the model of Section 3 as follows. There are now four time
periods, t ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1}. The sequence of decisions and events for the two agents
(depicted schematically in Figure 3) is as follows. In period t = −2, the two agents
decide simultaneously and independently whether to pay the second tier ex-ante costs
(c2A, c
2
B). If either or both agents decide not to pay these ex-ante costs, the period
13While the assumption that a fresh set of ex-ante costs arises at t = −2 is crucial for our result
(Proposition 7), the restriction to the negotiation of compensating transfers is not (Anderlini and
Felli 2001b).
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Figure 3: Timing in the two tier model.
t = −1 compensating transfers to be described shortly are automatically set equal to
0, and the agents effectively move directly to time t = 0. If, on the other hand both
agents pay the second tier ex-ante costs, then period t = −1 compensating transfers
can be negotiated.
For simplicity, we assume that (provided that both pay the second tier costs) at
t = −1, both agents make simultaneous offers of contingent compensating transfers
to each other. Formally, each agent i ∈ {A,B} chooses a real number σi ≥ 0, which is
interpreted as a commitment to transfer the amount of wealth σi to the other agent,
j 6= i, if and only if j pays the first tier ex-ante cost c0j in period t = 0. Immediately
after choosing σi, still in period t = −1, A and B simultaneously choose whether to
accept or reject the other agent’s offer of compensating transfer. Those offers which
are accepted at this stage are binding in period t = 0.
The decisions and events in periods t = 0 and t = 1 are analogous to those
described in Subsection 3.1. At t = 0, both agents choose simultaneously and inde-
pendently whether to pay the first tier ex-ante costs (c0A, c
0
B). Each agent i ∈ {A,B}
then incurs an ex-ante cost of c0i at this time, and subsequently receives a compensat-
ing transfer of σj from agent j 6= i. Only if both agents have paid the first tier ex-ante
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costs the t = 1 negotiation of the surplus-generating agreement becomes possible.
Provided both agents have paid their first tier ex-ante costs their payoffs are λ−γA
and 1 − λ − γB respectively, where γi denotes the total ex-ante costs paid by agent
i ∈ {A,B} during the entire game, minus any compensating transfer received from
agent j 6= i, and plus any compensating transfers paid by i to j. If the surplus-
generating agreement is not negotiated, then the two agents payoffs are simply −γA
and −γB respectively.
The assumption that the total (for both tiers) of ex-ante costs must be low enough
so that it is socially efficient for the parties to negotiate a grand agreement is easy to
state for this version of our model.
Assumption 3: Let ci = c
2
i + c
0
i for i ∈ {A,B}. Then cA + cB < 1.
It is apparent from the description of our model with compensating transfers above
(cf. Figure 3) that this model, viewed from t = 0, is in fact identical to the simple
model of Subsection 3.1, whenever both agents have chosen not to pay the second
tier ex-ante costs. We can therefore ask whether the parameters of our model with
compensating transfers are such that either Proposition 1 or Proposition 2 guarantee
that, in the absence of compensating transfers, the no-agreement outcome is the
unique equilibrium of the model. This motivates our next definition.
Definition 1: Assume that either c0A > λ or c
0
B > 1−λ so that, provided that neither
agent has paid the second tier ex-ante cost then the only equilibrium outcome of the
model is the no-agreement outcome (see Propositions 1 and 2 above). Then we say
that the model with compensating transfers ‘yields the no-agreement outcome in the
final stage’.
We are now ready to state our next proposition. It tells us that, if the parameters
of the model of Subsection 3.1 yield the no-agreement outcome, then adding a new
stage to the model, with a second tier of positive ex-ante costs and compensating
transfers may not solve the hold-up problem generated by the first tier ex-ante costs.
In particular, the model with compensating transfers has multiple equilibria, and at
least one equilibrium that yields the no-agreement outcome.
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Proposition 7: Consider the model with compensating transfers. Suppose that c0A,
c0B and λ yield the no-agreement outcome in the final stage (cf. Definition 1), and
assume that the second tier ex-ante costs are strictly positive for both agents (c2i > 0
for i ∈ {A,B}). Then the model has multiple equilibria. In particular, there always
exists an equilibrium in which neither agent pays either tier of ex-ante costs, and
hence yields the no-agreement outcome. Moreover, there is also an equilibrium in
which both agents pay both tiers of ex-ante costs and an agreement is negotiated.
The reason why the model with compensating transfers always has one equilibrium
in which none of the costs are paid is an obvious one. Recall that at each stage the
two agents decide simultaneously and independently whether to pay their ex-ante
costs. Moreover an agreement (or compensating transfers) is feasible only if both
agents pay. It is then immediately clear that if one agent expects the other not to
pay his ex-ante cost he should not pay either. The cost would be wasted since it has
no effect on the remainder of the game. Therefore it is an equilibrium for both agents
to pay none of the costs.
The intuition behind the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the
parties do pay both tiers of ex-ante costs and negotiate a grand agreement is less
straightforward.14
Imagine that some compensating transfers have been agreed. If the transfers are
such that the first tier ex-ante costs are ‘covered’ for both agents (which is always
possible in principle because of Assumption 3), then the terminal subgame of the
model has two equilibria. One in which an agreement is negotiated, and another one
in which neither agent pays the first tier ex-ante cost and the no-agreement outcome
obtains. Note that these equilibria are strictly Pareto-ranked.
It is then possible to construct an equilibrium in which the agents switch (off-
the-equilibrium-path) between equilibria of the terminal subgame, according to what
transfers have been offered and agreed in the first stage of the game. The ‘switching
point’ can always be constructed in such a way that it is in the interest of the agent
whose share of the surplus exceeds his costs to compensate the other for the shortfall
14We are indebted with Stephen Matthews for suggesting to us the existence of this type of
equilibrium in this model.
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between his share of the surplus and both tiers of ex-ante costs. The ‘threat’ of
switching to the inefficient equilibrium is ‘credible’ because the no-agreement outcome
is always one of the possible equilibrium outcomes of the terminal subgame.
Two observations come to mind with respect to the equilibrium just described.
First, even if the agreement is successfully negotiated this is done by paying two tiers
of ex-ante costs rather than one. Therefore, even when an agreement is reached the
equilibrium of the model is constrained inefficient.
Remark 1: All equilibria of the model with compensating transfers are constrained
inefficient. In particular, the inefficiency takes the form of the no-agreement outcome
for some of the equilibria, while for others it takes the form of an agreement that is
negotiated paying two tiers ex-ante costs rather than one.
Secondly, and in our view more importantly, the equilibria of our model with
compensating transfers in which an agreement is negotiated rely on the agents playing
(off-the-equilibrium-path) an equilibrium in the terminal subgame which is strictly
Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium of the same subgame. This runs against
the intuition that the parties to a negotiation will be able to re-negotiate ex-post to
an equilibrium which makes them both better off when one is available.
Imagine now that we impose the restriction that in the terminal subgame the
agents must play the Pareto-efficient equilibrium when the subgame has two equi-
libria. Then, after the second tier ex-ante costs have been paid, they are sunk in a
strategic sense. This means that the agent who has a ‘deficit’ in the last stage of the
game, by subgame perfection, will accept any offer of compensating transfer which
leaves him with a positive continuation payoff. Therefore in any equilibrium which
obeys this new restriction, the compensating transfers will not take into account the
second tier ex-ante costs. Therefore, one of the two agents will find it profitable not
to pay the second tier ex-ante cost for which he would not possibly be compensated.
This, in turn, means that compensating transfers will not be observed in equilibrium,
and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome. This is the focus of Proposition 8
below.
The idea that some type of renegotiation-proofness is an appealing additional
restriction to impose on the set of subgame perfect equilibria is not new, both in
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contract theory (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1988, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky 1992, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, No¨ldeke and Schmidt 1995,
among others), and in game theory (Farrell and Maskin 1989, Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti 1993, Benoˆit and Krishna 1993, among many others).
Below, we give an informal definition of a renegotiation-proof equilibrium which
applies to our model of this section.
Definition 2: A subgame perfect equilibrium of the model with compensating trans-
fers is renegotiation-proof if and only if the equilibria played in every proper subgame
are not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium of the same subgame.15
Our next result says the if we restrict attention to renegotiation-proof equilibria,
then the possibility of compensating transfers does not resolve the hold-up prob-
lem identified in Section 3. It is true that the model always has an equilibrium in
which transfers take effect and an agreement is negotiated. But this equilibrium is
not renegotiation-proof. Thus, although it may be tempting to select (in a Coasian
‘spirit’) the equilibrium with agreement among the two mentioned in Proposition 7
simply because it Pareto-dominates the no-agreement equilibrium, this type of selec-
tion is open to an objection which is, in our view, fatal.
Surely, if we are willing to select among Pareto-ranked equilibria in favor of the
dominating one, we should also be willing to apply the same logic to every subgame.
After all, once entered, every subgame is just like a game. However, if we apply this
selection criterion to every subgame (in a recursively consistent way, of course), the
only equilibrium of the entire game which survives is the constrained inefficient one,
in which the no-agreement outcome obtains.
Proposition 8: Consider the model with compensating transfers. Suppose that c0A,
c0B and λ yield the no-agreement outcome in the final stage and that c
2
A > 0 and
c2B > 0. Then every renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium of the model
involves neither agent paying either tier of ex-ante costs and therefore yields the
no-agreement outcome.
15Notice that our informal definition is made particularly simple by the fact that our model with
compensating transfers only has one ‘level’ of proper subgames.
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We view Proposition 8 as saying that the possibility of compensating transfers
does not resolve the hold-up problem identified in Section 3 in the following sense.
Either, we are willing to accept the multiple equilibria identified in Proposition 7, and
therefore to accept the no-agreement equilibrium as being just as plausible as the one
in which an agreement is negotiated. Or, we attempt to select among Pareto-ranked
equilibria in favor of the efficient ones. However in this case, we should apply this
logic consistently to every subgame, and hence single out those equilibria which are
renegotiation-proof. In this case only the no-agreement outcome survives.
Notice that the multiplicity of equilibria in the terminal subgame of our model is
crucially dependent on the fact that the ex-ante costs are payable simultaneously by
the agents. Therefore if the game is modified so that the costs are payable sequentially,
all subgames have a unique equilibrium and the no-agreement outcome is certain to
prevail.
In particular, consider the following modification of the extensive form depicted
in Figure 3. At t = 0 A decides whether to pay the ex-ante cost c0A. Then B observes
A’s choice and decides whether to pay the ex-ante cost c0B. The rest of the extensive
form is identical to the one in Figure 3. The following proposition characterizes the
equilibria of this modification of the model with compensating transfers.16
Proposition 9: Consider the modified model with compensating transfers which we
have just described. Suppose that c0A, c
0
B and λ yield the no-agreement outcome in
the final stage and that c2A > 0 and c
2
B > 0. Then, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the model is for neither agent to pay either tier of ex-ante costs, and
hence yields the no-agreement outcome.
5. Continuous Transaction Costs
So far, we have assumed that the agents’ decision regarding the ex-ante costs is
‘lumpy’; the negotiation of an agreement is not feasible unless both agents sink a
minimum, strictly positive, ex-ante cost. This is the reason why Propositions 1 and
16The alternative game in which B decides whether to pay the ex-ante cost before A is just a
relabelling of the one we just described. Proposition 9 below obviously applies to this extensive form
as well.
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2 above refer to a range of the distribution parameter λ for any given ex-ante costs,
and to a range of ex-ante costs given any value of the distribution parameter λ.
In this section we consider a model in which the agents have a continuous choice
of ex-ante costs. Our model is still a ‘reduced form’ one, in that we do not model
explicitly the effects of increased ex-ante costs paid by the agents.17 We simply
postulate that the size of the surplus yielded by the agreement which the agents
negotiate is an increasing function of the magnitude of the ex-ante costs paid by the
two agents.
The interpretation of our reduced form increasing relationship between the ex-ante
costs and the surplus generated by the negotiated agreement, we believe, is a natural
one. We imagine a situation in which, as the agents pay larger amounts of ex-ante
costs, more detailed agreements become feasible between them. The meaning of the
word detail here can range from a more accurate description of the relevant variables,
to a more detailed description of the possible states of nature (and therefore, in a
dynamic model, to agreements with a longer time horizon), to an agreement which is
better specified in legal terms, which as a consequence is more easily enforced, and
therefore yields a higher level of surplus net of ‘enforcement costs’.
The results which we derive in this section are the analogues in our set-up of the
general under-investment results stemming from a hold-up problem (Hart and Moore
1988). Formally, the model which we analyze is close to Holmstro¨m (1982), and can
be described as follows.
The two agents, A and B, play a two stage game. At t = 0, both agents decide,
simultaneously and independently, how much ex-ante transaction cost to pay. Agent
i ∈ {A,B} chooses a number ci ∈ [0, ci] with ci ∈ (0, 1).18 At t = 1 the agents do
not in fact have any choices to make; the pair of ex-ante costs (cA, cB) paid at t = 0,
determines the size of the surplus that the negotiated agreement yields to the agents.
This is then divided among them according to the exogenously given distribution
parameter λ. We denote with x(cA, cB) the surplus corresponding to the pair (cA, cB),
17In Anderlini and Felli (1996) we present a model (Section 8) in which the agents have a ‘gradual’
choice of ex-ante costs, and the effect of increased ex-ante costs paid is modelled explicitly as affording
the agents a more detailed agreement which extends further into the future.
18Recall that we are assuming throughout that the agents pay their ex-ante costs out of their
endowments which are available to them at t = 0.
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with xA(cA, cB) and xB(cA, cB) its partial derivatives with respect to the first and
second argument respectively, and with xA,A(cA, cB), xB,B(cA, cB) and xA,B(cA, cB) the
second and cross partial derivatives with respect to the same arguments. We assume
that x is a (twice-differentiable) strictly increasing and strictly concave function which
satisfies the Inada conditions lim
cA→0
xA(cA, cB) = ∞, lim
cB→0
xB(cA, cB) = ∞, xA(cA, cB)
= 0 for all cA ≥ cA and xB(cA, cB) = 0 for all cB ≥ cB.19 We also assume that the ex-
ante costs are complements in the sense that the cross partial derivative xA,B(cA, cB)
is always positive.
Given a pair of ex-ante costs (cA, cB), the payoffs accruing to A and B are given
by λx(cA, cB) − cA and (1 − λ)x(cA, cB) − cB respectively. We denote by c∗A and c∗B
the (unique) equilibrium ex-ante costs which the agents pay in the game we have
just described. Given that our assumptions on the function x guarantee an interior
solution, the equilibrium is easy to characterize.
Remark 2: The model with continuous ex-ante costs we have described above yields
a unique equilibrium pair (c∗A, c
∗
B), which can be characterized as follows by the cor-
responding first order conditions.
xA(c
∗
A, c
∗
B) =
1
λ
and xB(c
∗
A, c
∗
B) =
1
1− λ (1)
The efficiency benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium identified in
Remark 2 is straightforward to define and to characterize.
Definition 3: The socially efficient levels of ex-ante costs in the model with contin-
uous costs are denoted by cEA and c
E
B. They are defined as the pair of ex-ante costs
which maximize the difference between the surplus given by the negotiated agreement
and the sum of ex-ante costs x(cA, cB)− cA − cB.
There is a unique socially efficient pair of ex-ante costs (cEA, c
E
B), which can be
characterized as follows using the corresponding first order conditions.
xA(c
E
A, c
E
B) = 1 and xB(c
E
A, c
E
B) = 1 (2)
19Therefore, we are assuming that there are decreasing returns to scale in the relationship between
the ex-ante costs paid and the size of the surplus which the negotiation generates.
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Using the concavity of x and the fact that the cross partial derivative of x is
positive, it is easy to show that (1) together with (2) imply that c∗i < c
E
i for all
i ∈ {A,B}. This is the content of our next proposition.
Proposition 10: Let any value of the distribution parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) for the
model with continuous choice of ex-ante costs be given. Then, in equilibrium, both
agents pay an inefficiently low level of ex-ante costs in the sense that c∗i < c
E
i for all
i ∈ {A,B}. This obviously implies that x(c∗A, c∗B) < x(cEA, cEB).20
Thus, the agents under-invest in the ex-ante costs that determine the degree of
sophistication of the agreement they negotiate in equilibrium. Therefore, the agents
negotiate an agreement which is constrained inefficient in the sense that it is less
‘detailed’ than would be socially efficient, even after transaction costs are taken into
account.
The intuitive reason why the agents under-invest in their ex-ante costs according
to Proposition 10 is simple to outline. Each party’s share of the surplus generated
is fixed, the total surplus is an increasing concave function of both ex-ante costs and
these costs are complements. Each agent invests in his ex-ante costs only up to the
point at which his own marginal net return is zero. Such point is therefore below the
point at which the marginal social (across both agents) net return on his investment
in the ex-ante cost is equated to zero.
We conclude this section with an observation. Proposition 10 describes a stronger
inefficiency result than Propositions 1 and 2 above since it yields an inefficient outcome
regardless of the value of λ. Notice that our model of Subsection 3.1 can be viewed as
a ‘special case’ (in which the assumption of concavity of x is violated) of our model
with a continuous choice of ex-ante costs in which the size of the surplus yielded by
the negotiated agreement is a discontinuous function of the ex-ante costs paid by the
two agents. Intuitively, the ‘marginal’ conditions for efficiency are therefore easier to
satisfy in the model of Subsection 3.1 than in our present set-up.
20Notice that if we allow for λ to take the values 0 and 1 as well, we still obtain under-investment.
For instance if λ = 0, A will choose cA = 0, and B will set 0 < cB < cEB . If λ = 1, then 0 < cA < c
E
A
and cB = 0.
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6. The Size of the Surplus as a Function of Its Distribution
In our entire analysis so far we have assumed that the size of the potential surplus
generated by the negotiated agreement is determined independently of its distribution
across the two agents. Whether this is a good assumption or a bad one, depends on
the details of the Coasian negotiation at hand.
It is easy to think of a Coasian negotiation in which the ‘expected quality’ of the
object the parties negotiate on is determined (at least in part) by the action(s) of
one (or both) agents, after the agreement has been successfully negotiated. This is,
for instance, the case if the negotiation concerns a ‘principal’ and an ‘agent’. The
action of the agent in this case affects the amount of surplus available, and is in turn
affected by how much surplus the agent is able to appropriate. In Anderlini and Felli
(1996), we analyze a simple principal-agent model in which the interplay of incentive
compatibility and limited liability is the mechanism through which the size of the
surplus depends on the share left to the agent.
For reasons of space, in our analysis below we use, again, a ‘reduced form’ model
in which we simply assume that the size of the potential surplus depends on its
distribution between the two agents.
Intuitively, when the size of the surplus depends on its distribution, the hold-
up problem we have analyzed so far becomes less acute for the following reasons.
When the distribution of surplus is negotiated between the two agents, one (or both)
agent(s) may have an incentive to propose a ‘fairer’ distribution in order to increase
surplus size. It is then possible that, as a result, the distribution of surplus which is
agreed by the agents is ‘less mis-matched’ with the distribution of ex-ante costs than
would be the case otherwise. As we know from Section 3 this may resolve the hold-up
problem, and yield an equilibrium outcome in which the agreement is successfully
negotiated.
We make our next point in a very simple setting. Assume that the extensive form
of the negotiation between the two parties is such that agent A makes a take-it-or-
leave if offer of a share of the surplus to agent B. When the size of the surplus is
independent of its distribution the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this simple
extensive form of the parties’ negotiation corresponds to the parameter value λ = 1
in the black-box negotiation assumed in Subsection 3.1 above. Proposition 2 then
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implies that provided cB > 0 the unique equilibrium outcome of the model is the one
in which an agreement is never negotiated whatever the distribution of the ex-ante
costs. Hence, this is a situation in which the hold-up problem described in Section
3 above is most acute. We then couple this extensive form with a simple functional
form describing how the surplus size depends on its distribution, and we show that for
some possible configurations of (positive) ex-ante costs, in equilibrium an agreement
is in fact successfully negotiated. Thus the hold-up problem identified above becomes
less acute when the size of the potential surplus generated by the agreement depends
on its distribution across the two agents.
As before, x denotes the size of the surplus, while λ is the distribution parameter.
The function x(λ) embodies the dependence of surplus size on its distribution. We
assume x(λ) to be non-negative for every λ ∈ [0, 1], and that for some λ ∈ (0, 1],
x(λ) is strictly positive. The function x(·) is also assumed to be differentiable on its
domain.
At t = 0, A and B decide simultaneously and independently whether to pay the
given pair of ex-ante costs (cA, cB) which we assume to be affordable and strictly
positive. If either agent does not pay the ex-ante costs the surplus is not available
and the agents’ payoffs are equal to minus any ex-ante costs paid. If, on the other
hand, both pay the ex-ante costs, then A makes an offer λ to B, who may accept
or reject it. If B accepts the offer, an agreement is successfully negotiated and A’s
payoff is λx(λ)− cA, while B’s payoff is (1− λ)x(λ)− cB.
We start by identifying the socially efficient level of the distribution parameter λ.
Definition 4: The socially efficient level of λ in the model we have just described is
denoted λE, and is given by
λE = arg max
λ∈[0,1]
x(λ) (3)
Notice that, since we are assuming that the surplus is strictly positive for at least
some λ, we also know that x(λE) > 0.
The analogue of Assumption 1 above which guarantees that it is socially efficient
for the agents to negotiate an agreement is easy to state in our new model.
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Assumption 4: Let x(λE) > cA + cB.
The value of the distribution parameter in any equilibrium in which an agreement
is successfully negotiated is easy to characterize. Consider the subgame which begins
after both agents have paid the ex-ante costs (cA, cB). Then A will make an offer to
B which maximizes his continuation payoff, subject to the constraint that it should
be in B’s interest to accept the offer. In other words, A will offer to B a λ∗ which
solves
max
λ∈[0,1]
λx(λ) s.t. (1− λ)x(λ) ≥ 0 (4)
The solution to (4) is easy to find once we notice that the shadow price of the
constraint in (4) is always zero because x(·) is non-negative. Moreover, since x(·) is
strictly positive for some λ ∈ (0, 1], it must be that λ∗x(λ∗) > 0. Using these facts
and the first order conditions for (4) it is immediate that
Remark 3: If x′(1) + x(1) > 0 then λ∗ = 1. Conversely, if x′(1) + x(1) < 0 then
λ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if x′(1) + x(1) < 0 then x(λ∗) < x(λE).
We are now in a position to identify the range of ex-ante costs for which the fact
that the size of the surplus depends on its distribution is sufficient to resolve the
extreme hold-up problem described above.
We state Proposition 11 below without proof since it is an immediate consequence
of Remark 3.
Proposition 11: Assume that x′(1)+x(1) < 0. Then there exists a range of ex-ante
costs — namely Cλ = {cA, cB |0 < cA < λ∗ and 0 < cB < (1 − λ∗)} — which satisfy
Assumption 4 and such that the model has an equilibrium in which both agents pay
the ex-ante costs and an agreement is successfully negotiated.
If A finds it profitable to ‘bribe’ B in order to increase the overall size of the
surplus, it is possible that, in equilibrium, both agents will pay strictly positive ex-
ante costs and negotiate an agreement. This is in contrast to the extreme form of
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the hold-up problem described above that occurs when the size of the surplus is
independent of its distribution and λ = 1.
A final observation is in order. The possible equilibria identified in Proposition 11
in which an agreement is successfully negotiated are still inefficient in the sense that
x(λ∗) < x(λE). Since A only appropriates a fraction of the surplus, it is not in his
interest to offer B a λ which guarantees a global maximum of x.
7. Concluding Remarks
If the parties involved in a Coasian negotiation need to sink some ex-ante transaction
costs before they can reach the negotiating phase of their interaction, the ex-ante
costs may generate a version of the hold-up problem. If the distribution of ex-ante
costs and the distribution of surplus generated by the negotiation are sufficiently ‘mis-
matched’, one of the two parties to the negotiation will not find it to his advantage to
pay the ex-ante cost, even though the surplus generated by the agreement would be
sufficient to cover the total ex-ante costs associated with it. Therefore, in equilibrium
the agreement will not be negotiated. We have verified this claim in a variety of
simple models. Moreover we showed that the hold-up problem we have identified is
most acute when the agents have a continuous choice of ex-ante costs.
Unlike many other versions of this problem, under appropriate conditions, the
hold-up problem generated by ex-ante transaction costs is unlikely to have a ‘Coasian
solution’.21 This is because the Coasian negotiation that attempts to solve the hold-
up problem is likely to generate a fresh set of ex-ante transaction costs and hence a
new hold-up problem.
Lastly, we have explored a reduced form model in which the size of the surplus
depends on its distribution. In this case it is apparent that the hold-up problem
we identify is less pervasive than in the case in which the size of the surplus is not
affected by its distribution.
21By this of course we mean a negotiated contractual solution. A large literature has examined
the possible institutional solutions to the hold-up problem generated by contractual incompleteness
(Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, Aghion and Tirole 1997, Rajan and Zingales 1998).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 6: Since either λ < cA or 1−λ < cB , it is clear that there is no equilibrium
in which both agents pay the ex-ante cost at t = 0.
We only show that it is not possible that in any pure strategy equilibrium A alone pays the
ex-ante cost at t = 0. Any equilibrium in which B alone pays the ex-ante cost at t = 0 can be ruled
out in a symmetric way and we omit the details. Mixed strategy equilibria can be ruled out using
standard arguments and we omit the details.
Suppose then that there is an equilibrium in which only A pays the ex-ante cost at t = 0. There
are two cases to consider. Either B pays his cost to see A’s offer or he does not.
Suppose next that there is an equilibrium in which A only pays the ex-ante costs at t = 0 and
subsequently B either accepts or rejects A’s offer without seeing it. Note that in this case B cannot
condition his decision to accept or reject on the value of ` since he does not pay to see it. If B accepts
in equilibrium, clearly A will set ` = −. But this would give an equilibrium payoff of − to B, and
therefore yields a contradiction since B can always guarantee himself a payoff of zero by not paying
any costs and rejecting any offer. If B rejects A’s offer blind in equilibrium, then A’s equilibrium
payoff is −cA since no agreement is negotiated and A pays his ex-ante cost at t = 0. This is again a
contradiction since A can guarantee himself a payoff of zero by not paying the ex-ante cost at t = 0
(and rejecting any offers made by B if he pays his ex-ante cost).
Lastly, consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which A alone pays the ex-ante costs at t = 0
and subsequently B pays his ex-ante cost c′B to see the value of `, and then accepts or rejects A’s
offer. Notice that now B can condition his decision to accept or reject A’s offer on the actual value
of `. Using subgame perfection, it is immediate to see that, in equilibrium, it must be the case that
B accepts all offers which guarantee that 1− ` > 0 (his ex-ante cost is sunk when the accept/reject
decision is made). Therefore, in equilibrium, A will offer precisely ` = 1. It follows that in any
equilibrium in which A alone pays the ex-ante cost at t = 0 and subsequently B pays to see A’s
offer, B’s payoff is at most −c′B . But this is a contradiction since B, as before, can guarantee himself
a payoff of zero by not paying any costs and rejecting any offer.
Lemma A.1: Consider the terminal subgame of the model with simple compensating transfers
described in Subsection 4 which occurs after the pair of compensating transfers (σA, σB) has been
agreed, as a function of the pair (σA, σB). If the following inequalities are satisfied
λ− σA + σB − c0A ≥ 0 (A.1)
1− λ+ σA − σB − c0B ≥ 0 (A.2)
the subgame has two equilibria. If both inequalities are strict one equilibrium strictly Pareto-
dominates the other. The Pareto-superior equilibrium is such that both parties pay the ex-ante
costs (c0A, c
0
B) and the agreement is successfully negotiated leaving the parties with continuation
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payoffs (λ− σA + σB − c0A) and (1− λ+ σA − σB − c0B). The inferior equilibrium is such that both
parties do not pay the ex-ante costs (c0A, c
0
B) and yields the no-agreement outcome. If either or both
inequalities (A.1) and (A.2) are violated the terminal subgame has a unique equilibrium in which
neither agent pays the ex-ante costs (cA, cB), and hence yields the no-agreement outcome.
Proof: The claim follows immediately from the fact that an agreement is feasible only if both A
and B pay the ex-ante costs (c0A, c
0
B), and from the observation that either agent i can guarantee a
continuation payoff of zero by not paying his ex-ante cost c0i .
Lemma A.2: Consider the model with simple compensating transfers described in Section 4. If
there exists an equilibrium of the model in which both σA > 0 and σB > 0, then there exists another,
payoff equivalent, equilibrium of the model in which the transfers take the values σ˜A = σA−σB and
σ˜B = 0 if σA ≥ σB , and σ˜A = 0 and σ˜B = σB − σA if σB ≥ σA.
Proof: We examine only the case in which σA ≥ σB . The other case is a simple re-labelling of
this one. To construct the new equilibrium, let the strategies of both agents be identical to the
strategies in the original equilibrium, except for the way actions are conditioned on the other agents’
compensating transfer offer. In the new equilibrium, each agent i ∈ {A,B} responds to any offer σ˜j
(with j 6= i) exactly as he would respond to the offer σ˜j + σi in the original equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7: Recall that both tiers of ex-ante costs are payable simultaneously by the
agents and that an agreement (compensating transfer) is feasible only if both agents have paid the
first (second) tier of ex-ante costs. Therefore it is obvious that a pair of strategies which prescribe not
to pay any ex-ante costs for both agents (and some equilibrium behaviour off-the-equilibrium-path)
constitutes an equilibrium. This proves our first claim.
We now move to the construction of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the model with simple
compensating transfers in which the parties do negotiate an agreement.
We only deal with the case in which 1−λ < c0B . The case in which λ < c0A is a simple re-labelling
of this one and we omit the details.
Consider the subgame occurring after the transfers (σA, σB) have been agreed. If σB ≥ σA the
only equilibrium of this subgame is such that both parties do not pay the ex-ante costs (c2A, c
2
B). If
instead σA ≥ σB then by Lemma A.2 we can restrict attention to transfers which satisfy σA > 0
and σB = 0.
If σA is such that inequalities (A.1) and
1− λ+ σA ≥ c0B + c2B (A.3)
30
Transaction Costs and the Coase Theorem
are satisfied, we assume that the agents play the Pareto-superior of the two equilibria described in
Lemma A.1 in which the agreement is successfully negotiated. If instead σA is such that inequality
(A.3) is not satisfied while (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied we assume that the agents play the Pareto-
inferior of the two equilibria described in Lemma A.1 that yields the no-agreement outcome. In
case either or both (A.1) and (A.2) are violated then the agents play the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the subgame.
Proceeding backwards, it is then a best reply for B to accept any offer σA > 0 such that
inequality (A.3) is satisfied. Indeed, if B rejects the offer his continuation payoff is zero while by
accepting the offer his continuation payoff is non-negative.
It is then optimal for A to make an offer σA such that
σA = c2B + c
0
B − (1− λ) (A.4)
This offer is associated with a positive continuation payoff for A. A higher offer is associated with a
smaller continuation payoff while a lower offer is associated with a continuation payoff of zero, since
the parties expect to play the inefficient equilibrium whenever (A.3) is violated.
Therefore, in equilibrium both parties pay the second tier ex-ante costs (c2A, c
2
B). Paying the
cost, B obtains the payoff of zero which coincides with the payoff he gets by not paying. By paying,
A gets a strictly positive payoff while he gets a payoff of zero by not paying. This concludes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 8: We only deal with the case in which 1 − λ < c0B . The case in which
λ < c0A is a simple re-labelling of this one and we omit the details.
Since we are assuming that the parameters of the model yield the no-agreement outcome in the
final stage, any renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium which yields an agreement as an
outcome must have both agents paying both tiers of ex-ante costs.
Assume by way of contradiction that such an equilibrium exists and denote by a superscript ‘∗’
the equilibrium values of all variables in this equilibrium.
Notice first of all that if σ∗B ≥ σ∗A we have an immediate contradiction since in this case γ∗B > cB
and therefore B’s equilibrium payoff must be negative. Since B can guarantee a payoff of zero by
not paying any of the ex-ante costs this is a contradiction.
By Lemma A.2, we can then assume without loss of generality that σ∗A > 0 and σ
∗
B = 0.
Next, consider the subgame that starts after the transfers (σ∗A, σ
∗
B) have been agreed. We now
claim that every renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium must be such that
1− λ+ σ∗A − c0B = 0 (A.5)
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To see this notice that Definition 2 and Lemma A.1 imply that every renegotiation-proof subgame
perfect equilibrium must prescribe that in this subgame when
λ− σA − c0A > 0 (A.6)
1− λ+ σA − c0B > 0 (A.7)
are satisfied the parties play the Pareto superior equilibrium. This equilibrium involves both agents
paying the costs (c0A, c
0
B), negotiating an agreement and obtaining the strictly positive continuation
payoffs: 1 − λ + σA − c0B and λ − σA − c0A. However, any offer σA which satisfies (A.7) cannot be
payoff maximizing for A. Therefore the only renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium offer
has to satisfy (A.5).
It follows directly from (A.5) that B’s payoff in this renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equi-
librium would be −c2B . But this is a contradiction since B can guarantee a payoff of zero by not
paying any ex-ante costs. This is enough to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof can be constructed in a way which is completely analogous
to the one of Proposition 8 once we observe that when inequalities (A.6) and (A.7) are satisfied the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the terminal subgame starting at t = 0 is for both parties to
pay the costs (c0A, c
0
B), negotiated an agreement and obtain payoffs: 1−λ+σA−c0B and λ−σA−c0A.
Indeed, if A has paid his cost c0A it is optimal for B to pay the cost c
0
B as well given that B
obtains a strictly positive continuation payoff by doing so, while he gets a continuation payoff of
zero by not paying. On the other hand, if A does not pay his ex-ante cost c0A then it is optimal
for B not to pay his cost c0B either. If B does not pay he gets a payoff of zero while if he does pay
he gets a negative payoff. Therefore the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this subgame is for
both parties to pay their costs (c0A, c
0
B) and negotiate an agreement.
We omit the details of the remaining part of the proof.
Lemma A.3: Let any value of the distribution parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] be given. In equilibrium, in
the model with a continuous choice of ex-ante costs, it is not possible for both agents to pay an
inefficiently high level of ex-ante transaction costs in the sense that c∗i > c
E
i for all i ∈ {A,B}. This
is true irrespective of the sign of the cross partial derivative xA,B(cA, cB).
Proof: Let β = c∗A − cEA and δ = c∗B − cEB . Therefore, as k varies in [0, 1], (cEA + k β, cEB + k δ)
describes the whole segment between (cEA, c
E
B) and (c
∗
A, c
∗
B). Assume, by way of contradiction, that
β > 0 and δ > 0. The first order conditions (1) and (2) imply that xA(cEA +β, c
E
B + δ) > xA(c
E
A, c
E
B).
Therefore for some k it must be the case that the derivative of xA(cEA + k β, c
E
B + k δ) with respect
to k is strictly greater than 0. In other words
xA,A β + xA,B δ > 0 (A.8)
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Since β > 0, (A.8) implies
xA,Aβ
2 + xA,Bδβ > 0. (A.9)
Proceeding in a completely symmetric way we also obtain that
xB,Bδ + xB,Aβ > 0 (A.10)
Since δ > 0, (A.10) implies
xB,Bδ
2 + xB,Aδβ > 0 (A.11)
Inequalities (A.9) and (A.11) imply that
xA,Aβ
2 + xB,Bδ2 + 2xA,Bδβ > 0 (A.12)
which contradicts the fact that, by strict concavity the Jacobian of x(·, ·) must be negative definite.
Proof of Proposition 10: From Lemma A.3 we know that either β ≤ 0 or δ ≤ 0. We only
consider the case in which β ≤ 0. The case in which δ ≤ 0 can be treated in a symmetric way, and
we omit the details.
Assume that the proposition is false. Then β ≤ 0 and δ ≥ 0. By concavity xBB < 0, and by
assumption xAB > 0. Therefore
xBBδ + xABβ ≤ 0 (A.13)
Since (A.13) contradicts (A.10) this is enough to prove the claim.
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